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Abstract
Background: Results-Based Financing (RBF) has proliferated in the health sectors of low and middle income
countries, especially those which are fragile or conflict-affected, and has been presented by some as a way of
reforming and strengthening strategic purchasing. However, few if any studies have empirically and systematically
examined how RBF impacts on health care purchasing. This article examines this question in the context of
Zimbabwe’s national RBF programme.
Methods: The article is based on a documentary review, including 60 documents from 2008 to 2018, and 40 key
informant (KI) interviews conducted with international, national and district level stakeholders in early 2018 in
Zimbabwe. Interviews and analysis of both datasets followed an existing framework for strategic purchasing,
adapted to reflect changes over.
Results: We find that some functions, such as assessing service infrastructure gaps, are unaffected by RBF, while
others, such as mobilising resources, are partially affected, as RBF has focused on one package of care (maternal
and child health services) within the wider essential health care, and has contributed important but marginal costs.
Overall purchasing arrangements remain fragmented. Limited improvements have been made to community
engagement. The clearest changes to purchasing arrangements relate to providers, at least in relation to the RBF
services. Its achievements included enabling flexible resources to reach primary providers, funding supervision and
emphasising the importance of reporting.
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Conclusions: Our analysis suggests that RBF in Zimbabwe, at least at this early stage, is mainly functioning as an
additional source of funding and as a provider payment mechanism, focussed on the primary care level for MCH
services. RBF in this case brought focus to specific outputs but remained one provider payment mechanism
amongst many, with limited traction over the main service delivery inputs and programmes. Zimbabwe’s economic
and political crisis provided an important entry point for RBF, but Zimbabwe did not present a ‘blank slate’ for RBF
to reform: it was a functional health system pre-crisis, which enabled relatively swift scale-up of RBF but also meant
that the potential for restructuring of institutional purchasing relationships was limited. This highlights the need for
realistic and contextually tailored expectations of RBF.
Keywords: Results-based financing, Strategic purchasing, Zimbabwe, Maternal and child health care, Performance-
based financing
Background
Over the last decade, the model of RBF in which funds
to health facilities are made conditional on agreed out-
puts or outcomes, often with quality adjustments (some-
times also called performance based financing or PBF)
[1], has been increasingly implemented in fragile and
conflict-affected states (FCAS). While research and evi-
dence on RBF has grown since the first systematic re-
view of its application in low and middle income
countries [2], there remain some very significant gaps in
our understanding of it, in particular in FCAS, where
there is a need to understand the programmes’ prolifera-
tion and how they may operate differently in these con-
texts [3], but also to examine their integration and wider
system effects. RBF has been presented by some authors
as a health system intervention with the potential to
drive a more strategic approach to purchasing [4].
Others have suggested that it is likely that RBF could
spur strategic purchasing reform during the ‘expansion’
phase when it becomes part of the system [5]. However,
there has been limited empirical study of RBF’s impact
on strategic purchasing in low and middle income (and
especially fragile) countries.
Strategic purchasing is a core function of health finan-
cing, as defined by the WHO [6]. However, it is a rela-
tively novel concept and a single, clear definition of it is
still missing in the literature. A recent WHO policy brief
states that, “purchasing refers to the allocations of
pooled funds to healthcare providers for the delivery of
health services on behalf of certain groups or entire pop-
ulations” [7]. In order to be strategic, purchasing needs
to align funding (and incentives) with legal entitlements
of populations to health services, and allocations need to
be linked, at least in part, to information on aspects of
provider performance and the health needs of the popu-
lation served [7]. Becoming more strategic as a pur-
chaser involves movement along a spectrum. Meessen1
stresses how purchasing aims for an efficient allocation
of resources to producers of (equitable) good health, and
focuses on the role of purchasers and of stewards (e.g.,
Ministries of Health). In order to be strategic, purchasers
should focus on (i) identifying the best value, (ii) select-
ing the right providers, (iii) designing smart contracts,
(iv) efficiently enforcing such contracts. Under this, the
role of provider payment mechanisms and the best use
of information (through data, digital solutions and learn-
ing - [8]) are deemed to be essential to support strategic
purchasing. The potential for strategic purchasing to
also reduce fragmentation is acknowledgedi.
Others have conceptualised (strategic) purchasing as
involving three sets of decisions: (i) identifying the ser-
vices to be purchased, taking into account population
needs, national priorities and cost-effectiveness; (ii)
choosing service providers, giving consideration to qual-
ity, efficiency and equity; (iii) determining how services
will be purchased, including contractual arrangements
and provider payment mechanisms [9]. These three sets
of decision in turn require purchasers to engage in three
main relationships, with governments, with citizens and
with providers. For the purpose of this paper, we have
selected an analytic framework derived from this last
definition [9], which unpacks the concept of strategic
purchasing under those three main decisions and rela-
tions (Table 2). Despite the differences in definition and
conceptualisation of strategic purchasing, there is agree-
ment on the fact that it is a core element of every health
financing system and is essential to ensure progress to-
wards UHC as it has the potential to ensure improve-
ments in the efficient use of funds and in terms of
quality of services and equity [10, 11].
This article sets out to start filling the gap in empirical
analysis of the interaction of RBF and strategic purchas-
ing by examining the case study of Zimbabwe, which
since 2011 has gradually rolled out a national RBF
programme focused on maternal and child health
(MCH) indicators. Zimbabwe experienced a severe eco-
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2008 [12]. The crisis was characterised by dramatic re-
ductions in the value of funds allocated to health facil-
ities and health offices. Mitigation measures undertaken
by government and development partners included vari-
ous forms of targeted funding for core health pro-
grammes, including human resources retention, MCH
services, and procurement and distribution of essential
health commodities.
RBF started in July 2011 [13] as another response to
the health sector crisis. Initially, RBF started in two
front-runner districts of Marondera and Zvishavane,
then in an additional 16 districts, with funding from the
World Bank and implemented by Cordaid. RBF was
scaled up to all rural facilities in 2014, with funding for
the other districts coming from the pooled Health Tran-
sition (later Development) Fund (HDF), implemented by
Crown Agents. A World Bank impact evaluation has
been conducted [14].
In this article, we do not focus on the effectiveness of
RBF, but we examine its role as a strategic purchasing
mechanism, reflecting not just on the international debate
on this topic but also how the introduction of RBF was
framed in Zimbabwe, at least by some actors [13]. To do
so, we look at the purchasing arrangements pre-crisis in
Zimbabwe and the changes introduced through the RBF
programme, and draw lessons on the potential of RBF as a
strategic purchasing intervention in similar contexts.
Methods
Study design
The case study is largely retrospective, focusing on the
period since 2011, although drawing on insights into the
health system in Zimbabwe pre-crisis from earlier studies
[15, 16]. It is based on KI interviews at national, provincial
and district levels, integrated with analysis of documenta-
tion (policies and strategies, project documents and man-
uals, project evaluations and academic articles).
Study sites
Data collection was done at national level and in two
provinces (Midlands and Mashonaland East), including
four districts (Murewa, Marondera, Gokwe North and
Gokwe South). These provinces were selected as they
were the sites for the pilot districts in 2011. The districts
were chosen as representing one each from the two
schemes (Cordaid and Crown Agents) per province and
including the two pilot districts.
Document review
We searched for documents on RBF in Zimbabwe from
sources such as reliable websites (both for peer-reviewed
and grey literature, including the World-Bank RBF web-
site, the PBF Community of Practice and government
websites), suggestions from KIs from government
departments, donors and NGOs (including the implemen-
ters, Cordaid and Crown Agents), as well as documents
already available because of the long term engagement in-
country of the researchers. The documents included the
following:
 National health strategic plans and health financing
and system policy documents
 RBF project implementation manuals
 RBF evaluations and reports
 Minutes and reports from RBF meetings and
working group discussions
 Relevant academic articles
A snowball technique was adopted by checking the
references provided in the documents analysed and re-
trieving further relevant documents.
The documents date from the decade after 2008 – i.e.
after the most acute period of crisis and prior to the
introduction of RBF in 2011 – up till 2018. Some 60
documents were reviewed, the vast majority of which
were operational and grey literature.
KI interviews
Purposive sampling was used to identify KIs at national,
provincial and district levels, based on their knowledge
and involvement on RBF from its inception. The selec-
tion of interviewees was as comprehensive as possible,
including individuals currently holding RBF-related posts
or who were previously in such positions. A number of
relevant organizations, groups and individuals involved
in RBF were preliminarily identified. New individuals
were added based on the results of the documentary re-
view or as suggested by KIs. Individuals to be inter-
viewed included representatives of:
 Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) –
departments at central level, but also Provincial
Health Executives (PHEs) and District Health
Executives (DHEs)
 Other relevant ministries and national organisations,
such as Ministry of Local Government and Rural
Development and the Zimbabwe Association of
Church-related Hospitals (ZACH)
 Development partners and RBF funders present and
past: World Bank, HDF, Department for
International Development (UKAid), the European
Union, and United Nations agencies (such as
UNICEF)
 RBF implementers: Cordaid and Crown Agents, at
central and district levels
 Consultants and technical assistants who had
worked on RBF
Witter et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:180 Page 3 of 18
The breakdown of KIs interviewed (40 in total) is pro-
vided in Table 1. 18 MoHCC staff were interviewed at
national, provincial and district levels. The development
partner group was the next-largest constituency, with 10
KIs. Overall, men predominated, reflecting gender dis-
crepancies in public service, particularly at higher levels.
For RBF implementers, by contrast, staff at central and
field offices were more commonly female.
KIs were approached by email or telephone, providing
them with a brief explanation of the research project. A
time and date for an interview was agreed upon. Before
the interview, the researcher explained the study objec-
tives and scope, and informed consent was obtained in
writing. Confidentiality was assured. Consent was re-
quested for recording, with manual note-taking as a fall-
back option where the respondent was not comfortable
with the conversation being recorded or where security
arrangements or technology did not permit recording.
26 out of 40 interviews were recorded.
KIs were interviewed in English, using a semi-
structured interview guide, based on the strategic pur-
chasing framework [9], using a topic guide which was
developed by the research team (supplementary file 1).
Most interviews took place in the informant’s place of
work, but in a location where privacy was assured. Some
interviews were conducted by phone or Skype, where
physical distance or access necessitated it. Interviews fo-
cused on the period from 2008 (prior to RBF introduc-
tion) to present and were tailored to the time available
and the knowledge of the KI. Interviews lasted from 30
min to 2 hours, with an average of 1 hour. The question-
ing was led by a senior researcher, with a colleague
assisting in taking notes. Interviews took place from
early February to late March 2018.
Analytic framework
We analyse our findings using a strategic purchasing
framework which has been adapted from the literature
[9]. The framework reflects the conceptualisation of stra-
tegic purchasing as the interaction between the pur-
chaser and three levels of stakeholders: governments,
citizens (or the population) and providers. The frame-
work provides a descriptive and comprehensive list of
actions and decisions that need to be made with refer-
ence to these three sets of stakeholders to ensure (stra-
tegic) purchasing (Table 2). The framework was chosen
to provide a clear, pre-existing conceptualisation of a
broad concept. We later reflect on the advantages and
disadvantages of the framework chosen.
The choice of an existing framework was done expli-
citly to avoid creating something ‘ad hoc’ for our analysis
but rather rely on a previous, theoretical exploration of
the concept. However, given the novelty of the concept
of ‘strategic purchasing’ and its operationalisation, we
recognise that there is a discussion to be had around the
framework itself, beyond our specific findings. While this
is not the purpose of the paper, we briefly do so in the
first part of the discussion section.
Data analysis
Data analysis was done iteratively. A first analysis of
the documents collected was conducted before the in-
terviews in the field, and guided the discussion during
interviews. Later on, new documents were added to
the review, and a final thematic analysis [17] was con-
ducted of documents and interview transcriptions or
notes, using mostly pre-defined themes based on the
strategic purchasing framework [9] which was adapted
to the specific context and to reflect on the role of
fragility in the case study (Table 2). Results of the
analysis of documents and interviews were written-up
together to allow for triangulation and complementar-
ity between data sources.
Ethics
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Research Ethics
Panel of Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, and
from the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe. The
study also received authorisation from the MoHCC.
Results
Based on the analytical framework adopted, our ana-
lysis considered in turn which bodies were undertak-
ing purchasing functions and actions (as listed in the
framework) prior to RBF, how clear their roles were
and how these changed (or did not change) as a re-
sult of the introduction of RBF in Zimbabwe. The re-
cent history of the health system and the political-
economic crisis in Zimbabwe is important both as a
catalyst to the introduction of RBF but also in under-
standing the legacy of capacity within which RBF
operated [13].
Table 1 KIs summary
Male Female Total
National MoHCC staff 5 0 5
PHEs 3 3 6
DHEs 4 3 7
Other ministries and public bodies 1 2 3
Development partners 7 3 10
Consultants 3 0 3
Implementers 1 5 6
TOTAL 24 16 40
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Key strategic purchasing actions by government
The key purchasing functions at government level
are considered to include: mobilising resources to
meet service entitlements; holding purchasers ac-
countable; and assessing service delivery infrastruc-
ture gaps [9].
Mobilisation of resources to meet service entitlements
Since independence, the public health system in
Zimbabwe was developed as an integrated model, with
planning starting at rural health centre (RHC) and dis-
trict level, which was coordinated through the Provincial
Medical Directors (PMDs) and fed into national budgets.
Resources to support the provision of the primary care
package (established in 1995 [18] were mobilised
through central taxes, with additional revenues at the
local level from user fees.
The growing political-economic crisis, which cul-
minated in hyper-inflation in 2008, led to a collapse
in private and public resources for health care [19],
and facilities were forced to charge the public for
services, even those which were meant to be free,
such as MCH. The public and private sectors en-
tered survival modes – hardly able to pay their staff
and to continue to function. At this time, those
with diverse sources of funding (such as municipal-
ities, which are able to collect local taxes) were bet-
ter able to reward and keep staff [16, 20]. After the
height of the crisis in 2008, the role of donors in-
creased, providing resources in the recovery period
after the formation of the Government of National
Unity in 2009. Resources were employed to re-
attract and retain staff, purchasing essential supplies
and providing technical and material inputs to im-
prove the quality of care. Donors’ support was fo-
cused on the primary level and especially maternal
health, as maternal mortality rates rose dramatically
during the crisis [21].
Since its introduction in 2011–12, RBF has provided
an estimated extra $2 per capita amount, focused on
core MCH indicators, along with one indicator targeting
new outpatient cases.2 RBF has been supported by the
Health Development Fund (a pooled donor funding
mechanism), the World Bank and the Ministry of Fi-
nance, which provided a small co-financing to the World
Bank-supported programme since 2015. The World
Bank funds could be regarded as additional, as the fund-
ing was conditional on Zimbabwe adopting a result-
based financing modality. On the other hand, the HDF
funding was already being invested in an input-based
manner in 2011–14 (under its earlier label of Health
Transition Fund), and would likely have continued as
such if it had not shifted to RBF in 2014 for part of its
support. Both funding streams have been reducing and
are insecure in the long term [22].
Despite the donors’ funding, and given the on-going
economic and fiscal challenges in Zimbabwe, overall re-
source mobilisation by government (and donors) for
purchasing health care services remains inadequate [23],
with households contributing around 25% of total health
expenditures in 2015, of which 95% out of pocket [24].
As a result of the lack of funding, purchasing is at times
perceived as an empty exercise.
‘Purchasing is very under-developed because there
are no public funds. It boils down to purchase of
basic commodities’ (national KI)
Accountability of purchasers
Different purchasers account to different constituencies –
the Rural District Councils (RDCs) report to the Ministry
of Local Government and local populations in relation to
rural primary health care, while urban primary care and
Table 2 Key actions for strategic purchasing in relation to different stakeholders within the health system
Key strategic purchasing actions by government •Mobilising resources to meet service entitlements
•Holding purchasers accountable
•Assessing service delivery infrastructure gaps
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to
citizens/population served
•Ensure community participation and engagement
•Assess needs, preferences, values of the population and use them to specify benefits
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to
providers
•Establish service agreements/contracts, and accredit providers
•Develop formularies and standard treatment guidelines
•Design, implement and modify provider payment methods to encourage efficiency and service
quality, establish provider payment rates and pay providers regularly
•Allocate resources equitably across areas and implement other strategies to promote equitable
access to services
•Establish and monitor user fee policies
•Secure information on services provided/ develop, manage and use information systems
•Monitor provider performance and act on poor performance
•Audit provider claims and protect against fraud and corruption
2Detailed information about the design and the evolution of the RBF
programme in Zimbabwe against the background of the economic
crisis can be found in [13]
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some public health services are purchased by municipalities
(also under the Ministry of Local Government). The
MoHCC accounts to the Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Development, as well as downward through health
facility committees to communities.
Two parastatals were also established to purchase and
coordinate specific services - the National AIDS Council,
established in 1999 to administer the National Aids Levy
funds and purchase HIV services, and the Zimbabwe
National Family Planning Council, which leads family
planning purchasing and service delivery in Zimbabwe
[18]. They have integrated performance agreements with
the MoHCC.
Mission health facilities have over the years received
grants from the MoHCC but there is still no clear Memo-
randum of Understanding or formal service contracts be-
tween them [18]. As a consequence, there has been very
limited oversight and accountability around the disbursed
grants to mission facilities. This reflects in part limited
capacity within the MoHCC to monitor the performance
of mission facilities receiving these grants [25].
During the crisis, most of these accountability systems
had stopped functioning because of the lack of resources
for purchasing. In addition, development partner funds
could not be channelled through the government sys-
tem, given the poor relationships with then Mugabe-led
government. As a result, the bulk of aid funds are man-
aged by a few external organisations – for example,
UNICEF is the fund-manager for the HDF, and manages
medicines, supplies and commodities procurement,
while the United Nations Development Programme is
the main Principal Recipient for the Global Fund for
AIDS, TB and Malaria. There is limited transparency in
relation to their overhead costs and overall expenditure,
as well as the familiar challenges of fragmentation and
lack of coordination.
Within the introduction of the RBF programme, new
actors were entrusted with the some parts of the pur-
chasing role. For MCH services at primary level in par-
ticular, the two external implementation contractors,
Cordaid and Crown Agents, play a lead role in purchas-
ing, although they are guided by a national steering com-
mittee to which they are accountable.
Service delivery infrastructure
Infrastructure is managed by a range of bodies, including
the mission sector, municipalities (which manage urban
health facilities) and RDCs, which own the majority of
rural primary care facilities. The MoHCC exercises over-
all stewardship and is required to give permission for
new (public) infrastructure. An assessment of RBF
carried out in 2016–17 suggested that rationalisation of
infrastructure was needed – it noted that even the most
effective purchasing methods driven through an
inefficient provider system will produce sub-optimal re-
sults [22]. Density of population and catchment popula-
tions vary significantly (e.g. from 2000 to 11,000 people
per health centre in just one district visited), making it
hard for facilities with smaller populations (often more
remote ones) to generate funds and bonuses. With RBF,
the flow of funds follows service use, which tends to re-
flect the existing infrastructure.
‘A scheme like this tends to solidify existing infra-
structure. It does not distinguish between efficient or
not. It doesn’t tend to drive mergers or networks of
providers, for example’ (national KI).
There is no evidence that RBF in Zimbabwe has pro-
moted a review of infrastructure arrangements. The
mixed ownership of health care infrastructure and low
budgets for capital expenditure, as well as political fac-
tors, make reforms to infrastructure challenging.
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to
population served
In this section, we consider purchasing in relation to,
first, community participation and engagement, and, sec-
ondly, in relation to assessing the service needs, prefer-
ences and values of the population and using them to
specify service entitlements.
Community participation and engagement
Community participation and engagement is included in
the analytic framework we adopted as an essential elem-
ent in strategic purchasing. It includes informing the
population of their entitlements and obligations, ensur-
ing the population can access their entitlements, estab-
lishing effective mechanisms to receive and respond to
complaints and feedback from the population, and publi-
cally reporting on resource use and other measures of
results [9].
Zimbabwe had a history of strong community engage-
ment in health care [26]. The Health Services Act of 2004
established health facility committees at various levels,
and a Patient Charter was introduced in 1996. However,
only 49% of health centre committees (HCCs) sampled
were still functioning in 2010, after the economic crisis
[26], when a survey found evidence of wider but limited
in-kind contributions, such as labour, from communities
to health facilities, particularly in rural areas.
One of the conditions for being contracted under the
RBF programme was to have an operational HCC [27],
and the HCCs have been incentivised to be more active
as the health centres now have resources to manage dir-
ectly, in line with the operational plans which they have
to develop. As with HCCs, operational planning pre-
dated RBF but has been given a boost by it as resources
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are now available to carry out what were previously the-
oretical plans. 86% of HCCs surveyed in 2016 were func-
tional [28]. The Health Transition Fund evaluation finds
variable performance across the HCCs, linked to local
dynamics, but concludes that community links were
probably stronger than before the programme. An evalu-
ation of an independent project to support HCCs [29]
concludes that RBF led to a change in HCC roles, which
had previously focused on resource mobilisation and
now focus on resource allocation. In addition to revita-
lising the role of HCCs, RBF enforces a number of ele-
ments of community accountability, such as provision of
suggestion boxes and making pricing visible in facilities
as part of its quality checklists. Verification also includes
quarterly client satisfaction surveys by community-based
organisations or the implementing agency field officers.
Despite these processes linked to the introduction of
RBF, community members showed low awareness of the
work of the HCCs and reluctance to use mechanisms
such as complaints boxes [28]. The World Bank impact
evaluation also highlights problems of political interfer-
ence, low capacity -especially on financial management
as members are drawn from the community and may
have no accounting background - and lack of represen-
tativeness of HCCs [14]. The evaluation concludes that
they are unable to offer meaningful community partici-
pation, or to improve the quality and utilisation of MCH
services. At the same time, the client satisfaction surveys
appear rather insensitive with scores above 80% on aver-
age and unvarying over time [22]. Additionally, it is not
clear how well the results of those surveys are fed back
into improved responsiveness of services.
‘There is now some measurement of client satis-
faction and some feedback. However, we need
improvement in how we respond to these. For
example, the HCC should be discussing the scores’
(national KI).
Assessing service needs, preferences and values to
specify service entitlements
Despite the efforts described above to strengthen com-
munity participation and engagement, there has been no
consultation on the users’ needs or preferences to feed
into the benefits package, as this is agreed nationally and
there is no scope for variation at local level.
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to
providers
In this section, we examine how providers are
contracted and paid, how the crisis impacted these pur-
chasing functions by starving them of resources, and
how these functions have been affected by RBF.
Establishing service agreements/contracts and accrediting
providers
Some elements of active purchasing and contracting
existed in the Zimbabwe health system before the intro-
duction of RBF. For example, in 2005 a Results-Based
Management approach was introduced into the health
system, but it was never fully operationalized due to lack
of national funds [30] [13]. A literature review of health
care purchasing in Zimbabwe [18] highlighted the lack of
clarity in contracts and entitlements across the other sec-
tors (e.g. local government and the private sector), as well
as in finance for these from various subsidy streams. It
commented on the lack of separation of regulation and
purchasing functions in the MoHCC, Ministry of Local
Government and mission sectors. Performance agree-
ments existed between the levels of the MoHCC but with-
out supportive resourcing, while these are lacking with or
within local government and the private not-for-profit
sectors. Private health insurance and private social insur-
ance were found to be spending more on investment and
administration than direct service provision.
RBF reintroduced a contractual approach, with eight
contracts being specified by Zimbabwe RBF Project Imple-
mentation Manual [27], one of which was with providers.
In terms of providers’ accreditation, RBF has not intro-
duced any changes to the existing system – all public
and mission facilities were accepted within RBF as long
as they met the minimum managerial criteria, such as
development of operational plans, having a functional
HCC, having a bank account, and agreeing to remove
user fees for mother and child health care (a prior
MoHCC policy which RBF aimed to reinforce).
‘The World Bank wanted institutions to qualify to
be included. We wanted all in – if they were weak,
they could be supported to improve’ (national KI).
Developing formularies and standard treatment guidelines
Equally, RBF has worked within existing clinical guide-
lines, which were relatively well developed prior to the cri-
sis. The health system assessment of 2010 found well
developed guidelines for treatment of common conditions,
though their availability at facility level was mixed [26].
Designing, implementing and modifying provider
payment methods to encourage efficiency and service
quality; establishing provider payment rates and paying
providers regularly
Historically, much of the purchasing was done at na-
tional and district levels. Funds from central level and
user fees were retained by hospitals, while virtual ac-
counts were held at district level for the purchasing of
commodities on behalf of the primary health units. Med-
icines and supplies were nationally purchased and
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supplied using a pull system. Staff were hired centrally,
deployed by the provinces to facilities, and paid salaries
from the national payroll. Purchasing of public and pri-
vate health services through health insurance, including
medical aid for civil servants, covered around 10% of the
market, with contracts specifying price and quality.
The introduction of RBF did not affect the purchasing
arrangements in the wider public sector and the pur-
chasing arrangements and payment mechanisms remain
mixed. The bulk of public resources continue to go to
staffing through salaries - in 2017, salaries made up
around 79% of total MoHCC allocations and a much
higher share of total actual expenditure [24] – as well as
medicines and supplies, through input-based channels.
Resources are still managed at district level for non-RBF
funds; these include the Health Service Fund (for user
fees and donated funds), and Government of Zimbabwe
funds, with shadow budgets operated at district level on
behalf of primary facilities. Within the MoHCC, individ-
ual programmes also undertake purchasing for their spe-
cific commodity areas, adding to the under-powered and
fragmented public purchasing system. A number of the
main health system pillars also have their own agencies
to purchase inputs, with the Health Service Board hiring
and managing health staff, and NatPharm the medicines
and supplies. The private health insurance market (con-
sisting of some 40 medical aid societies) continues to
function but is squeezed between rising costs and
supply-induced demand, on the one side, and limited
ability of the population to pay for health insurance on
the other [25]. In theory, providers should operate fixed
tariffs for insured patients across the industry but these
are reportedly not respected.
At the facility level, historically, facility budgets were
based on a mix of past trends and planned activities, though
half of the District Medical Officers and the bulk of PMDs
surveyed in 2010 reported using results-based budgeting
[26]. RBF changed the payment mechanism in particular
for primary care units, as discuss below in relation to (i) de-
sign, (ii) effects on quality of care and (iii) efficiency.
Design issues & regularity of payments
RBF has focused on maternal health, reflecting priorities
post-crisis. The payments per indicator are based on a
number of factors, including the available budget (which
appears to be the dominant element to influence pay-
ments), levels of desired coverage, which indicators were
lagging, and stipulated distribution between primary and
secondary level facilities. The ratio has been fixed at 60%
(of total budget) to primary and 40% to secondary,
though the rationale behind this ratio is not clear [31]
[28]. However, the payments per indicator do not reflect
actual production costs for services nor were they
pegged to previous fees charged by facilities. As one of
the respondent said,
‘It is not very strategic. Prices [for RBF indicators]
are set by the budgets, not the other way round. And
the budget is also never enough’ (national KI).
A drop in prices in 2013 led to overall fall in facility
revenues, with 63% receiving below the budgeted
amount per facility. Analysis by Cordaid does not how-
ever find any impact on the performance of indicators of
this price reduction [32]. This indicates that RBF may be
functioning less as an incentive and more as a useful
general source of resources at primary level to enable
providers to do their work. It also found a high correl-
ation between earnings and the catchment population of
the facility, suggesting that size of catchment population
is the main driver of earnings [23, 33].
In addition to RBF, facilities have continued to receive
other sources of support, not least for their main expendi-
tures, such as staff and medicines. However, RBF augmented
these and was significant in bringing flexible funding to the
RHC level at a time of national budget shortfalls.
‘We noticed positive changes. But it was not just
$15million buying results. The HTF was bringing in
essential good [s], and money for meetings etc. RBF
helped make use of HTF resources efficient. So it was
a combination of input- and output-based payments.
It wouldn’t have worked with just one. We needed
everything’ (national KI).
There is therefore concern that the budget and pay-
ments drop due to funding shortfalls in 2017–18, along-
side inflation in general costs, will undermine gains.
There was a reported 60% drop in facility revenues in
late 2017, completely unconnected to any change in per-
formance. Caesareans, for example, which were paid
$140 previously (not enough to cover costs, according to
some), are now only paid $40.
‘RBF works through financing. If it is underfunded,
then it does not work … If funding goes, it will be
hard to deliver these services’ (local KI).
The hospitals have also been starved of funding, es-
pecially in the HDF districts where hospitals received
flat rate subsidies [22]. In the referral hospitals sup-
ported through the World Bank, RBF was estimated
to provide 80% of their income, even though it only
covered a few indicators [22]. This is being addressed
in 2018 through extending RBF contracts to all dis-
trict hospitals as well as an increased national
budget allocation for hospitals.
Witter et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:180 Page 8 of 18
Encouragingly, there is evidence of learning and iter-
ation in the design of the RBF programme – for example,
adjustments which were made in 2017 after the health sys-
tem assessment [34]. These revisions were agreed through
a participatory Delphi process with subsequent adjust-
ments. However, adjustments are complex, as they have to
take into account trends in coverage of indicators, chan-
ging burden of disease and strategic priorities, alongside a
limit on the budget. Currently, indicators are fixed nation-
ally but there is some discussion of allowing for more local
tailoring to health priorities.
In terms of regularity of payments, all payment sys-
tems have been affected by the financial crisis in
Zimbabwe, causing delays and shortfalls. RBF has pro-
vided financial relief for facilities but is itself now subject
to budget pressures, leading to reduced payments and
also delays of several months in paying providers.
Quality of care
Quality of care attracts additional payments in the
Zimbabwe RBF programme. A quarterly checklist is
filled by the DHE (for RHCs) and the PMDs (for district
hospitals). The maximum weight for quality of care was
25% of overall payments, though in practice only 18%
was disbursed for quality in the Cordaid scheme [34]. As
outputs are now high, but health outcomes still lagging
in some key areas, the 2016 assessment recommended
an increased weight for quality of care [22]. In addition,
staff bonuses are now tied more closely to the quality
score, as this is seen as more clearly within their influ-
ence; for those receiving less than 60% on the quality
index, all staff bonuses are lost. The aim was also to en-
sure that populations are not penalised (through reduced
resources) for poor staff performance [22]. This change
has helped low catchment facilities, but penalised high-
volume ones (which used to be able to cover their costs
through the higher quantity payments).
The original quality checklist was very oriented to repro-
ductive and MCH services but has now been expanded to
be broader and also to focus less on structural factors and
more on clinical (the weighting of the scores is now 65%
clinical, and 35% structural, as adjusted in 2016). It now in-
cludes a number of domains - structural; management and
planning; client management; and client satisfaction - with
on-going debate about their appropriate relative weights
[34]. The community satisfaction survey results feed into it
and contribute 20% of the overall quality scores.
In the impact evaluation, client satisfaction with ante-
natal services in RBF facilities was found to be higher
overall, but there was no significant difference for child
health services. Few significant differences in structural
or equipment indicators were found, though there was
some evidence of improved medicines availability [14].
Out of eight quality of care domains, only one (family
and child health) showed significant improvement in
RBF facilities over controls.
Quality scores are high and have plateaued (all falling
between 84 and 87% in the 42 HDF districts in 2016 [22],
so it is not easy to discriminate on quality. These scores
suggest either that performance is genuinely high across
almost all facilities or that the measurement process is not
sufficiently sensitive or robust. As the quality scoring is
carried out by the DHEs, it would be understandable if
there was internalised pressure to score highly. It also re-
mains important to use the tools to guide supportive dis-
cussions to identify and address problems.
‘We should be diagnostic about why quality scores
are lower [when they are]. There is usually a conver-
sation about this but limited follow up, which is de-
motivating. We need to focus on carrots more than
sticks’ (national KI).
The RBF programme has coordinated its approach
with the wider national strategy on quality improvement
[35], and has benefited from many wider investments in
quality – for example, the up-skilling of Primary Care
Nurses, and projects such as the MCH Integrated Health
Programme, which provided training in obstetric care.
However, concerns remain on the length of time taken
to fill in quality assessment checklists - an estimated 2–
3 h per RHC, occupying the nurse who also is lead clin-
ician in the facility. There is an overall need to reduce
duplicating data collection (for example, the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief checklist is reported to
take 6 hours to fill in and have overlapping questions).
Efficiency
In terms of outputs, the impact evaluation of the 18 dis-
trict RBF scheme in Zimbabwe showed some positive re-
sults [14, 35], although it should be noted that resources
were not matched across intervention and control sites
(so some of the results may follow from increased re-
sources rather than RBF as a payment mechanism). In a
period in which there was a general recovery in MCH
indicators throughout the country, faster improvements
were made in the 18 districts in institutional births and
post-natal care. This differential did not apply to ante-
natal care attendance, modern contraceptive use, and
immunization rates. There was no evidence of conse-
quential neglect of non-incentivised services.
Some of the RBF indicators are high and appear to
have reached a threshold beyond which it is hard to go
(leaving residual hard to reach populations, especially
those with cultural barriers). Others continue to under-
perform – for example, postnatal care (which had a
coverage of 47% in 2016) and supervised deliveries (59%
coverage in 2016) [22]. Some community-based services,
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like vitamin A distribution, continue to be under-
reported. This highlights the need for continual adjust-
ment of indicators to ensure that purchasing is indeed
strategic.
As RBF pays per output, with added bonuses for qual-
ity, it could be seen as inefficient in a system with moti-
vated providers (who are being paid to deliver results
that they would anyway have strived to deliver). In this
context, incentivising them to reach the final 10–20%
hard-to-reach populations would make more sense.
However, in Zimbabwe, the crash in national budgets
has meant that RBF is covering basic running costs. It
has enabled reasonably flexible resources to reach the
front-line providers, which most informants saw as an
important improvement given the post-crisis constraints.
The incentivised indicators include services with high
coverage, such as antenatal care, while others with high
burdens of disease have not been included. A recent re-
port pointed out that there was no tuberculosis indica-
tor, for example, while this is the fourth cause of
disability-adjusted life years lost among women of child-
bearing age [36] [32]. This has been addressed in 2018
through the addition of some wider indicators, though
the payments attached are currently so low as to be
demotivating.
Given the complexity of RBF and the separation of
functions, the programmes have incurred high over-
heads, running at up to 23% of scheme costs over and
above the existing management costs of districts, though
it is acknowledged that these have reduced over time
and include some important elements such as training
and quality improvement [22]. Some of the tools are also
costly to administer – the cost of the community satis-
faction survey, for example was found to be US$ 5 per
questionnaire, which was much higher than the add-
itional subsidies allocated to health facilities from this
component [32, 36].
Another concern has centred on the inefficiency of
medicines being purchased at facility level, compared
to the previous pull system (pre-2009), when medi-
cines were centrally procured. District hospitals were
found to be spending around 26% of their RBF funds
on medicines in the Crown Agents districts [22], but
with higher levels at RHCs. Health facilities can buy
from approved pharmacies but there are no long term
pricing agreements as yet to help reduce medicine
costs. This however is a consequence of wider prob-
lems, unrelated to RBF: the central agency, Natpharm,
remains extremely underfunded and 99% of all the
pharmaceuticals handled by it are donor-funded [24].
The need for coordination of various financing
streams in procurement and distribution systems for
commodities is widely recognised and reforms are be-
ing proposed [22].
There has been limited analysis of how RBF funds
have been spent. In the initial phase, there was a focus
on infrastructure, especially the construction of mater-
nity waiting homes, though it is unclear how well used
these now are.
‘It is still not clear how the facility funds were used.
It is hard to assess purchasing at the facility level
without that data. Is procurement more expensive at
the facility level? It is still not clear’ (national KI).
The MoHCC recently sent instruction to limit expend-
iture on travel and subsistence to 10% of RBF revenues,
indicating a concern about the costs of purchasing, rais-
ing quotations and so on. A move to electronic quotes
and payments would reduce these costs but with poor
network access, this may be a challenge for many RHCs.
Allocating resources equitably across areas, and
implementing other strategies to promote equitable
access to services
Zimbabwe has focused on equitable health system devel-
opment post-Independence. However, it lacks a resource
allocation formula – this is highlighted as a priority in
the Health Financing Strategy [25]. Public budgets have
been set based on historical patterns and planned activ-
ities. With RBF, funds are not allocated by area but fol-
low utilisation, which benefits facilities with large
catchment populations (which are often in better con-
nected, and therefore more prosperous, areas). There
were concerns early on about RBF reinforcing inequities
in the system, so there was an initial infusion of funds
for all facilities to help them reach a minimum standard.
However, preliminary calculations in 2016 indicated that
even with additions for the quality score and remoteness
payment, about 60% of RHCs earn less than $600 per
month, which is judged to be the minimum operating
cost of the average health centre [22]. Such facilities are
also likely to be adversely affected by the application of
the 5% inaccuracy rule (which penalised inaccurate
reporting). They were unevenly distributed across prov-
inces, with some provinces, such as Matabeleland, suf-
fering from low RBF earnings in particular [23, 33].
Some clinics in towns were included after the start of
RBF in order to stop the flow of clients from towns to
RHCs, however most urban areas and the two main cit-
ies, Harare and Bulawayo, are excluded. (There was a
voucher programme piloted in these two areas3 but this
was small-scale and limited in terms of services covered.)
This is problematic for the deprived areas within them.
3https://www.rbfhealth.org/resource/zimbabwes-urban-voucher-
programme
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An urban delivery voucher scheme has been piloted but
remains low in coverage.
While infrastructure is distributed relatively equitably
in Zimbabwe, staffing is less so, especially for doctors
[37]. While RBF does not directly influence this, it may
have incentivised some staff to move from district hospi-
tals to RHCs, especially in areas where RHCs were
funded through RBF and district hospitals through flat-
rate subsidies (as the staff incentives were better at the
RHC level in these areas). This will presumably reduce
in 2018 as district hospitals join the RBF programme.
RBF’s focus on MCH care at the primary level is inher-
ently equitable, and the programme incorporates add-
itional payments to allow for facility remoteness [27].
Depending on the level of “remoteness”, an additional
payment is made to the facility of up to 30% of the value
of the quantity payment [22], though in practice in the
Cordaid Scheme 4% of the total payments were made
based on remoteness [34]. This is unlikely to provide
sufficient incentive to reach challenging populations.
Establishing and monitoring user payment policies
Zimbabwe has offered MCH services at primary level
without user fees since the 1990s [37]. At secondary care
level, mothers and children and those over 65 years of
age do not pay for services. However, during the crisis
years, these policies were not fully enforced due to lack
of financing for services and lack of supplies and medi-
cines [18]. RBF and other investments, like the HDF
input-based financing, helped to enforce the policy.
RDCs previously collected revenues from their health
facilities [37] and there was some reluctance to stop this
source of fund-raising. Mission facilities were also
dependent on user fees. The RBF programme helped to
enforce the removal of user fees for MCH services across
these sectors (though not in municipal facilities, which
are in urban areas), and also to negotiate that RBF pay-
ments were retained and managed by health facilities.
Some RDCs are reported to be continuing to levy small
charges, which are used to pay for security guards. How-
ever, one report notes progress from 60% of facilities of-
fering fully free maternity services in early 2012 to 95%
in 2015, with RBF facilities more likely not to charge fees
[28]. By late 2017, only 2.4% of hospitals and 10% of sec-
ondary or higher facilities were reported to be charging
for antenatal care, one of the core free services [38]. The
RBF impact evaluation, however, does not find a lower
incidence of out of pocket payments in RBF versus con-
trol facilities [14].
Zimbabwe used to operate a social welfare system in
which Assisted Medical Treatment Orders, managed by
the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, were used to
identify vulnerable people for exemptions from user fees.
This system broke down due to lack of funding during
the crisis. In the RBF facilities, HCCs are meant to iden-
tify people without access and support them, but this
may not be very systematic. User fees remain a burden
for all other services, including at hospital level, for other
uncovered services and sectors, and in urban areas, con-
tributing 24% of overall health expenditure [25]. Other
mechanisms are needed to support financial access, and
to address cultural barriers (for example, in the substan-
tial sub-population which reject medical interventions
for religious reasons).
Securing information on services provided, and
developing, managing and using information systems
The Health Management Information System (HMIS)
was reported by some informants to be weak pre-RBF,
with little incentive to focus on accurate reporting at the
facility level. However, an assessment in 2010 suggests
that the system was better than in many sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries, with 80% completeness, 68% accuracy
and 67% timeliness for the main T5 form (which reports
on outpatient care at district level), though capturing
only an estimated 50% of private sector services [26, 39].
Many services, like growth monitoring, were provided
but not recorded as that was an additional task. Feed-
back to districts and provinces was good, but less sys-
tematic at facility level (49% of facilities reported
receiving written feedback on their data in 2010 [26].
RBF has not influenced the reporting (or lack of it) by
the private sector but is seen by many as having placed a
helpful emphasis on quality of reporting by public, pre-
dominantly primary level facilities. Under its rules, over-
or under-reporting of indicators by more than 5% results
in no payments being made for that indicator. This is
seen by some as too draconian: this is a normal margin
of error and penalises facilities (which have incurred ex-
penses for the services provided) for what may be an
error of just one case at the facility level. Most report
fewer than 20 outputs per indicator per month [40] [36],
so with only one incorrectly recorded in a minor way
may lose the entire funding of that indicator. The esti-
mated lost income from this rule for the 42 Crown
Agents districts was $3.7 million over two years (2014–
16), which meant considerable resources not invested in
improving maternal, newborn and child health [36, 40]
– some 46% of the resources actually paid out.
‘It is fine to adjust for quality, but they shouldn’t be
paid zero when they have forgotten to put the tele-
phone number of the lady who was delivered. If we
did this in the UK, for example, there would be an
outcry!’ (national KI).
For the Cordaid scheme, however, the average per-
centage loss of subsidies dropped from 50% in 2012 to
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7% by 2015, allowing for the introduction of a lighter
risk-based verification system.
Overall, there is an understanding that the gap in re-
ported and verified data has closed over time. This is
widely seen as one of the main benefits of RBF, but may
be partly an artefact of measurement – aggregate data
over a quarter is presented, in which under-reporting by
some facilities is balanced out by over-reporting in
others, thus making reported data look close to verified.
On a facility by facility basis, however, more than 50% of
facilities are still having errors, even on simple indicators
like antenatal care visits, even after 3–5 years of RBF im-
plementation and support. Analysis of data for the
Crown Agents facilities in 2016 found that lost income
from the 5% error rule stabilised at 27–29%, suggesting
that 2 years into implementation, facilities were still los-
ing considerable amounts due to poor data [40, 36]. The
HTF evaluation confirmed the complexity of accurate
reporting, as perceived by health staff, even after several
trainings [28].
‘We should be progressing but are staying in the
same place, as we continue having to retrain on the
basics, like data entry’ (local KI).
At facility level, staff continue to face the problem of
multiple data reporting and data streams – RBF is not
responsible for this, however, it has not helped to reduce
the burden. There are 34 registers to be filled [41] [21],
as well as overlapping surveys which absorb staff time.
‘Beside the HMIS and the national data warehouse,
stakeholders are conducting several parallel routine
health facility evaluations processes. For the time be-
ing, each rural health care facility is surveyed at
least 12 times a year (this does not take into account
HIV, TB, malaria, supply chain supervisions and
SARA surveys)’ (national KI).
‘The staff are sometimes overwhelmed. They have to
balance the day-to-day running of the facilities and
the quality of data … Many who were trained in
2014 have now left and so there is a need for con-
tinuous monitoring and training’ (local KI).
There is a need to move to digital systems and merge
data streams to make reporting and monitoring more
manageable.
RBF implementers have been operating two RBF in-
formation systems, linked to the HMIS for quantity
indicators and deriving data from it but not feeding
back into it. However, in 2018 the Cordaid system
migrated to the MoHCC as part of the institutionali-
sation programme. An integrated information system
is appropriate in the long term but poses short-term
risks.
In addition to better and lighter recording, correct
analysis of data has been a challenge, given that the
reporting system was based on HMIS data, which can be
reviewed and revised retrospectively. This makes data
management and trend analysis difficult, even for the
implementation agencies.
‘They are working in Excel files, with mistakes in re-
lation to facility names, and therefore probably also
in payments. … This is probably similar in other
places’ (national KI).
Monitoring provider results and acting on poor results
Performance management systems were in place prior to
RBF, but faced challenges in relation to their systematic
application, including resource constraints, such as a
lack of skilled personnel, competing priorities and high
workloads, challenges in patient privacy and restrictive
work spaces [18]. An assessment in 2010 found that
most PMDs and District Medical Officers were reporting
monthly or quarterly supervision, using an integrated
checklist. Just under 60% of planned supervisions were
carried out [26].
RBF has provided resources to support supervision at
provincial and district levels. The Provincial Health Ex-
ecutives have four indicators, which focus on administra-
tive tasks in relation to the RBF programme. DHEs have
12, which are a mix of performance-related and adminis-
trative. Some indicators are questionable – for example,
staff posts being filled according to the facility establish-
ment [27] is not within the control of the DHE, nor are
the established posts up to date and therefore appropri-
ate [22]. However, the funds provided through these in-
dicators can enable wider support and supervision, if
used well. There is now discussion of setting up national
payment indicators for RBF supervision.
Previously supervisions were reported to be less clearly
structured – focussed on high priority areas, like im-
munisation, but not comprehensive. This is seen as a
positive spill-over for the health system of RBF, al-
though, as noted above, there are concerns about the
length of time taken to fill in quarterly supervision
forms, especially for the DHE, which has to visit many
clinics, often with difficult access, and which is penalised
if reports are not timely. DHEs also receive support from
other donors for supportive supervision and it is not
clear if these funds are duplicating or are being used in
an integrated way.
There are reports of inconsistencies in assessing too,
such that scores may be higher in areas where there is
less supervision, but lower where the checklist is used
robustly. In these latter cases, there is more likely to be
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progress over time. District leadership and attitudes are
a key factor here, as is committing time at the facility
level and by supervisors to follow up on problems and
action points.
‘Performance varies by DHE. Everything works if you
have a good DHE, whether input- or output-based.
Some are good at motivating, and others not. The
human factor is key’ (national KI).
‘The problems identified are often not resolved. A
major reason is that the sisters have no time to go
through the checklist when we have left. The health
centres are burdened with 21 registers, each filled on
a daily basis. The checklist is just another job for
them’ (local KI).
The facility operational plans, which existed previously
but were less structured, are an important vehicle to
identify and address priority issues which RBF reinforces.
The facilities are also supported by the implementation
agencies’ health field officers, who currently provide
training, mentoring, verification (see below), and support
for problem solving, especially on procurement at the fa-
cility. This raises concern about how to continue this
level of support once RBF is institutionalised within the
public system, as currently planned [42].
‘The MoHCC does not have urgency … it is so over-
whelmed... Will the facilities be paid on time? ..We
need someone who is very accountable. The MoHCC
is a regulator but not very accountable. It is respon-
sive, not proactive … Many DMOs [District Medical
Officers] don’t even know the checklist or where facil-
ities are’ (local KI).
RBF is embedded in wider national institutions. The
district-level RBF steering committees are meant to meet
quarterly and to report to the District Development
Committees [27], but vary in their level of engagement.
Normally, RBF issues are discussed at District Health
Team meetings, which ensure intersectoral collaboration
(with a similar structure at provincial level). As done
pre-RBF, benchmarking is used to create additional per-
formance pressures, with results shared in district and
provincial meetings.
Wider rigidities remain within the health system – for
example, constraints on recruitment due to the staffing
freeze, the inability to remove under-performing staff
and managers, resources which are channelled through
vertical procurement programmes. RBF has not been
able to influence these major inputs and processes in the
health system. The RBF system itself is also somewhat
unwieldy – given its complex systems, making
alterations to reflect changing conditions and priorities
is not simple or low-cost.
‘RBF is very simple – it is just paying invoices at the
end of the day. But with 1,000 facilities to train, the
reality is that people don’t change the system easily.
Once people have understood it, nobody dares to
change anything. It is very expensive to do so too’
(national KI).
Auditing provider claims and protecting against fraud
and corruption
Verification was not previously required as payments
were not output-based. Under RBF, verification systems
differ across the two implementers and have also chan-
ged over time. In the Cordaid programme, the local field
officer originally provided the first-line verification,
followed by external checks by the University of
Zimbabwe until late 2017. The latter was dropped in order
to save costs. The community sisters (based at the district)
are now responsible for monthly verification in both
schemes, though many report lack of access to vehicles
and fuel to conduct these as regularly as expected.
Counter-verification is then conducted by the Health Field
Officers, who also conduct quarterly exit interviews to as-
sess community satisfaction (in the Crown Agents dis-
tricts). Community-based organisations are contracted to
undertake these in Cordaid districts, to maintain more
separation of functions. The plan for institutionalisation is
that verification will be conducted by Community Sisters
and HMIS officers (in hospitals), with counter-verification
by members of the Health Profession Authority.
Overall, there is no evidence of significant gaming, which
has allowed a shift to a risk-based verification system from
2014. In Crown Agents districts, only 2% of facilities are
now considered to be ‘high risk’. This could be attributed
to RBF controls but more plausible is that the system and
organisational culture does not promote gaming.
In relation to finance and procurement, the DHE
checks on procurement procedures, which are complex
and follow national guidelines (there are, for example,
12 steps for RHCs to follow when procuring [27]. Each
requisition requires three signatures, including by the
HCC and DHE. In one district visited, about 30% of pur-
chase orders are returned because of irregularities,
mostly related to the difficulty of mastering the process
and staff or HCC turn-over. Again, there are concerns
about how these verification activities can be maintained
in an integrated national system.
‘It is an expensive mechanism because of the separ-
ation of functions. For example, an independent
fund-holder – it costs to set up a separate entity …
The verification is also heavy, you have to verify
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every little bit. With better IT, it should be easier,
but we have limited capacity’ (national KI).
A more mature system would likely use accreditation
of facilities, electronic records and periodic clinical au-
dits (as Zimbabwe used to have and which could be revi-
talised). While RBF has a strong focus on controls over
proper use of funds and demonstrating success, some
argue that it has been less successful in using data intel-
ligently to understand problems in the system and how
they might be addressed.
‘PBF is now full of people crazy about control. This
was not the original goal – it was to get money to the
providers. … This doesn’t make sense any more. Con-
trol should not be the first purpose’ (national KI).
Discussion
This study has some limitations. In terms of data collec-
tion, care was taken to include all of the main stake-
holders and participants in this policy, not just present
but over its history. However, the interviews could not
be comprehensive. In some cases, KI were time-limited
so interviews had to focus on a limited range of ques-
tions. Equally, many of the documents which describe
the process of policy development and roll out are confi-
dential or not available, so while the researchers tried to
access as broad a range of documents as possible, they
could not be comprehensive.
More importantly, our analysis is based on an existing
framework [9] which unpacks the concept of strategic
purchasing based on the actions that needs to be carried
out in relation to three sets of stakeholders. This frame-
work is based on a broad and inclusive interpretation of
the concept of ‘strategic purchasing’. As explained in the
Introduction, others have suggested a narrower focus,
focussing on elements such as identifying best values, ac-
creditation and contracting of providers, as well as on
the use of datai .The breadth of the framework, which
also gives equal value to each element, frames our con-
clusions on RBF’s impact on strategic purchasing and
raises for further discussion the question of which ele-
ments are the most critical within it, and indeed raises
the interesting question of how far RBF’s theory of
change itself highlights the same or different elements as
the strategic purchasing framework. This would be rele-
vant for future investigation. Finally, it is important to
note that the framework has been developed to analyse
‘strategic purchasing’ mechanisms in general and not
specifically RBF or the effects of RBF on purchasing ar-
rangements. Indeed, as elaborated below, RBF remains
one of the mechanisms among others, and does not ne-
cessarily aim to cover all the actions and decisions of
strategic purchasing – though arguably it should be
aligned and integrated with the existing purchasing
architecture4 .
Despite the limitations, this article adds to the limited
literature on RBF in low and middle income countries
and how it affects and makes more ‘strategic’ the exist-
ing purchasing arrangements. Based on our case study
of Zimbabwe, it suggests that expectations of institu-
tional reform and in particular the potential for RBF to
drive a more strategic approach to purchasing [5] [4]
should be moderated, particularly at early stages of RBF
implementation [43] . Considering our strategic purchas-
ing framework, we find (see summary in Table 3) that
rather than systematically reforming strategic purchasing
functions, in contexts like Zimbabwe’s RBF adds a new
provider payment mechanism into the mix, which can
produce benefits, but also adds to a complex landscape
and does not resolve many underlying challenges [44]
[45]iv. Some functions, such as assessing service infra-
structure gaps, are unaffected by RBF, while others, such
as mobilising resources are partially improved, as RBF in
Africa has focused on one package of care (MCH ser-
vices) within the wider essential health care, and even
here has contributed only marginal costs. Purchasers’ ac-
countability has typically been to funding agencies, espe-
cially in the case of more fragile settings where
independent purchasing structures have been created, al-
though in countries such as Zimbabwe, with stronger
health systems, a degree of national accountability has
been created. Limited improvements have been made to
community engagement. However, the clearest changes
to purchasing arrangements relate to providers, at least
in relation to the sub-package of services on which RBF
has focused.
This case study illustrates the complexity of assessing
health system reforms, particularly in dynamic contexts.
The question of where the baseline is drawn is of par-
ticular importance. For those working in Zimbabwe over
the last decade, RBF is part of a story of reconstruction
and strengthening of the health system and its perform-
ance. However, for those with a longer memory of how
the system operated pre-crisis, there is often a different
perspective – of putting resources into a system which
had once been highly functional and had not lost its re-
sidual capacity and professionalism [13]. In this second
narrative, many of the problems observed post-crisis
were due to a combination of resource constraints and
short term measures introduced by partners, to assist in
an environment where trusting relationships with gov-
ernment were limited. In this respect, Zimbabwe exhib-
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Table 3 Summary of findings: impact of RBF on purchasing functions in Zimbabwe
Key strategic purchasing actions
by government
Ensure adequate resources mobilised •RBF provided modest but partially additional funds, still significant
for primary care providers
•Focused on MCH indicators
•Donor dependent, though some Ministry of Finance copayments
in later years
Ensure accountability of purchaser(s) •Parallel system with external purchasers
•Accountability of purchasers to funders as well as to government
•Bulk of purchasing continued through other channels, not
affected
Fill service delivery infrastructure gaps •RBF provided some upfront investment, but no major revision of
infrastructure planning in relation to needs
Key strategic purchasing actions
in relation to citizens/population
served
Inform the population of entitlements
Establish mechanisms for complaints and
feedback
Publicly report on use of resources and
performance
•RBF requires price list to be made public on the facility wall
•Community satisfaction survey carried out as part of RBF
verification
•RBF helped revive Health Centre Committees and shifted their
focus from resource mobilization to resource allocation; variable
results and capacity
Assess needs, preferences, values of the
population to specify benefits
•No consultations on needs, values and preferences linked to RBF
package
•Package defined nationally with no scope for variation at local
level
Key strategic purchasing actions
in relation to providers
Establish service agreements/select (accredit)
providers
•RBF did not change accreditation system
•RBF required facilities to meet minimum criteria, including
developing an operational plan, having a bank account and a
functioning HCC
•RBF introduced contracts; contracts are limited to services and
facilities covered by RBF
Developing formularies and standard
treatment guidelines
•RBF worked within existing guidelines; no change introduced here
Design, implement, modify provider payment
methods to encourage efficiency and quality
Establish provider payment rates
Pay providers regularly
•RBF introduced payment rates for services (not the practice before
in public purchasing)
•Mixed picture in terms of outputs and quality improvements
•Focus on MCH services, including some for which coverage is
high, raising questions about efficiency; no local ability to adapt
indicators
•RBF functioning more as financing mechanism than incentive
(partly because of wider budget cuts)
•Payments driven mainly by catchment population size
•Concerns over regularity and sustainability of payments (rates
have been reduced over time); costs of RBF implementation high
but reducing
•Evidence of learning/iteration but RBF system is complex to adjust
•Some quality improvements (e.g., drugs availability) and
convergence on national tools for quality improvement (though
still some duplication across programmes)
Allocate resources equitably and implement
strategies to promote equitable access
•Remoteness bonus, but considered too small and failed to
compensate facilities with small catchment areas
•Equitable design in terms of service package covered
•Poor urban areas excluded
Establishing and monitoring user payment
policies
•RBF aimed to remove user fees for the MCH services it covered.
However, no difference in incidence of out of pocket payments
between control/intervention areas found in impact evaluation
•Financial and non-financial barriers continue to be significant
Securing information on services provided,
and developing, managing and using
information systems
•RBF brought greater focus on data quality, though still many
weaknesses
•System for penalizing poor recording may be too strict (causing
unfair loss of revenues by facilities)
•RBF used HMIS data after having verified and corrected it
•Providers have multiple data reporting requirements
Monitoring provider results and acting on
poor results
•Pre-existing well developed and integrated supervision system to
which RBF provided funding
•Variation in robustness of supervision, linked to wider issues of
leadership and resources
•Considerable technical support required from implementers’ field
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mobilisation and the associated challenges of managing
donor funds – but not others (for example, retaining in-
stitutional and professional capacity in the health sector).
Before the crisis, there was a strong planning function,
with good economists and planners. As noted by the
World Bank, the Zimbabwe system had been efficient
pre-crisis in producing health outcomes at relatively low
cost, although that efficiency had declined during the
crisis [19]. This makes assessment of the contribution of
RBF more challenging: was it simply enabling a func-
tional system to operate or was it embedding necessary
systemic reforms?
Assessing changes to purchasing and the contribution
of RBF to make it more strategic is also challenging in
light of the wide-ranging nature of this concept under
the framework adopted for analysis. At a broad level, the
volume of funding coming from RBF (an estimated $2
per capita [46]) was not sufficient to expect radical
changes to structures and systems. Some aspects were
however clearly appreciated, such as the more structured
approach to supervision. We note a greater separation of
the purchasing function, a reinforcement of community
engagement, more attention to quality of data and in-
creased primary facility autonomy over resources. Most
of the changes occurred at provider level. The impacts
on facility governance in the impact assessment were
not significant however [14]. High external dependence
for resources and fragmented purchasing – especially
common elements in fragile and conflict affected set-
tings [47] - are important constraints for the govern-
ment and for RBF. The administrative weight of the RBF
programme has also been a challenge to agility, as noted
in other settings where verification and transaction costs
have been high [48].
Reflecting on [43], we find that Zimbabwe followed a
particular trajectory, with geographic expansion occur-
ring before institutionalisation, which reflects the history
and political economy of the policy [13]. It seems clear
that RBF benefited from the managerial capacity in
Zimbabwe, which also enabled the MoHCC to take own-
ership of the programme and to ensure its adaptation to
context [13]. However, RBF has continued to function as
a vertical programme with an MCH focus and relatively
little engagement from other programmes, and has not
contributed to a reduced fragmentation in the sector.
This reflection is also found in a paper on health worker
motivation and RBF in Zimbabwe, which concludes that
introducing RBF arrangements cannot alone overcome
chronic systemic weaknesses, which require explicit or-
ganisational change management processes to be put in
place across the system [49]. A survey of health care
purchasing in five (RBF and non-RBF) districts in 2014
[50] also highlighted some important outstanding chal-
lenges, including unpredictable and inadequate funding
for key purchasing functions; weak knowledge in dis-
tricts of available resources and weak planning; cost es-
calation and external dependency, making it difficult to
build internal systems for efficiency and effectiveness;
and variation in the funding of different categories of
services, with non-communicable diseases having no
prepayment arrangements in place and some conditions
with rising health burdens not being effectively pur-
chased, leaving users exposed to charges or restricted ac-
cess to the service, despite treatment guidelines for
services being in place in all institutions and treatment
procedures and patient data being recorded.
The Health Financing Strategy highlights the on-going
inadequate capacity in the MoHCC for strategic pur-
chasing [25], and highlights weak control mechanisms
for compliance (use of funds for the intended purposes)
as well as performance (value of money and achievement
of results) as one of its chief challenges. The overall ap-
proach to purchasing remains to be clarified, including
how RBF will relate to the planned national health insur-
ance system [25] and development of an essential health
care package. Other assessments have highlighted the
need for a central unit in the MoHCC focusing on per-
formance management of the overall system [22]. In a
companion piece, we highlight some of the critical
choices facing the institutionalisation of RBF in
Zimbabwe today [13].
Conclusions
While RBF has been presented by some as a potential
catalyst to wider health system reforms and as a tool to
increase strategic purchasing, the example of Zimbabwe
– one of the few countries in Africa to be implementing
RBF on a nationwide scale and widely seen as a success-
ful example of RBF – suggests that we should have more
realistic expectations, at least in the short term. RBF in
this case brought focus to specific outputs – MCH ser-
vices at primary level – but remained one purchasing
mechanism amongst many, with so far limited traction
over the main service delivery inputs and programmes. Its
Table 3 Summary of findings: impact of RBF on purchasing functions in Zimbabwe (Continued)
officers (and challenges in institutionalizing that)
Auditing provider claims and protecting
against fraud and corruption
•Complex verification/counter-verification procedures for RBF, and
restrictions on procurement (from public finance rules)
•Little evidence of false claims, able to move to risk based
verification; challenge of shift to longer term (integrated) controls
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achievements included enabling some flexible resources to
reach primary providers, funding supervision and empha-
sising the importance of reporting. Set against that were
many constraints, including implementation costs at dif-
ferent levels of the system and broader challenges facing
the whole sector after a decade of disinvestment.
Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis provided an
important entry point for RBF, as a programme which
could bring much-needed resources, but Zimbabwe did
not present a ‘blank slate’ for RBF to reform: it was a
highly functional health system pre-crisis, which both
enabled relatively swift scale up of RBF but also meant
that the potential for significant restructuring of institu-
tional relationships in relation to purchasing was more
limited. With RBF, Zimbabwe has taken some important
steps in the direction of strategic purchasing, but many
gaps remain and the country still has to emerge from its
chronic economic challenges and define its vision for the
future of strategic purchasing for health, and RBF’s place
within that.
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